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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, most professionals including accountants, architects, engineers,
physicians, and other healthcare professionals, are subject to liability from third
parties they harm as a result of their negligence. However, attorneys continue to
remain immune from third party liability, except in very limited circumstances.
The extent that an attorney can be liable to a non-client for negligence is a con-
troversial issue, and the present state of the law governing it is far from settled.
Recently, there has been a significant increase in the number of cases brought
against attorneys by third parties for professional negligence. Therefore, this is
an issue of great significance to attorneys who find themselves threatened with
the same expansion of liability that they have brought to other professionals.
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In the past, attorneys and other professionals were completely immune
from suits brought by non-clients due to the requirement of privity.] In the in-
terest of justice, American courts began to move away from the strict privity
requirement in manic negligence cases by recognizing exceptions to the general
rule of nonliability. Today, most professionals are subject to liability to non-
clients for negligence3 and attorneys are increasingly facing this liability.
4
Although attorneys have traditionally owed a duty of care only to their
client, they should also owe a duty to non-clients to conduct a reasonable inves-
tigation prior to filing a lawsuit. Frivolous litigation has become way too com-
mon in American jurisprudence, congesting court dockets and causing economic
and emotional harm to the victims of these lawsuits who do not have any ade-
quate recourse available to them. As a result of these baseless lawsuits, defen-
dants are left with unnecessary attorney fees and expenses associated with litiga-
tion, lost time defending the suit, increases in insurance premiums, annoyance,
inconvenience, emotional distress, and damage to their reputations.5 However,
attorneys who file these baseless lawsuits out of incompetence or greed continue
to do so because there are no consequences. Often, these attorneys benefit fi-
nancially from their conduct because defendants will settle to avoid the cost of
litigation and/or the time and emotional effort involved in successfully defend-
ing a lawsuit. It is time for American courts to correct this injustice and recog-
nize a cause of action against attorneys brought by third party adversaries for
negligence.
This article surveys the present law on attorney liability to adversaries
and proposes that attorneys should be liable to non-clients for their professional
negligence. Section II of this article explores the development of the law of
privity, and how courts are increasingly eroding it in order to achieve fair out-
I See Nat'l Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). In National Savings Bank, the Supreme
Court held that the doctrine of privity of contract barred suit by a bank against a bank's adverse
counsel who were professionally negligent in conducting title examinations, despite the fact that
the attorney's neglect really occasioned the bank's loss. Id. at 198.
2 See MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
3 See, e.g., Vause v. Bay Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing a
duty of a physician to nonpatients); Mullray v. Aire-Lok Co., 216 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968) (recognizing a duty of accountants to non-clients); Robert & Co. Assocs. v. Rhodes-
Haverty P'ship, 300 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. 1983) (recognizing a duty of engineers to non-clients); Hiat
v. Brown, 422 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing a duty of architects to non-clients);
Rauh v. Kornkven, 852 P.2d 328 (Wyo. 1993) (recognizing a duty of real estate agents to non-
clients).
4 See, e.g., Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Schunk v. Zeff & Zeff,
P.C., 311 N.W.2d 322, 331 (Mich. App. 1981) (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
5 This is especially true for physicians who are forced to leave the practice of medicine be-
cause they are unable to afford their insurance premiums. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591
F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
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comes. Section III discusses the causes of action that are currently available to
third parties to take action against attorneys for legal malpractice. Section IV
provides an in depth discussion of professional negligence actions brought
against attorneys by non-clients and concludes that American courts should
adopt a cause of action against attorneys by third parties for professional negli-
gence.
II. BACKGROUND ON PRIVITY
Traditionally, attorneys and other professionals were completely im-
mune from lawsuits filed by non-clients. In early cases, an action for economic
loss was barred in the absence of a contractual agreement because of the privity
requirement.7 Winterbottom v. Wright,8 an English case, established that privity
of contract was a necessary requirement to maintain an action for negligence.
9
The United States Supreme Court adopted this rule in 1879 in National Savings
Bank v. Ward,t0 holding that without privity there can be no duty owed to a
third party, and therefore, no cause of action for negligence.
11
Recognizing that this rule did not always produce just results, American
courts began to move away from the strict privity requirement in negligence
cases in order to avoid the harsh result of barring an injured plaintiff from re-12
covery. The movement away from strict privity began in cases involving
fraud or collusion and then spread to the area of products liability. 13 Eventually,
this movement reached most professions resulting in recovery by non-clients for
negligence despite the absence of privity. 14  This movement evolved more
slowly in the area of attorney negligence, and was first recognized in cases con-
6 See Nat"l Say. Bank, 100 U.S. at 195.
7 See id. at 200.
8 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
9 In Winterbottom, the court held that the manufacturer of a mail coach was not liable to the
driver of the coach who suffered injuries as a result of a latent defect in the coach's construction
since no privity of contract existed between the driver and the manufacturer. Id. at 405.
10 100 U.S. at 195.
It id. at 206. Cases where fraud and collusion were proven were an exception to this rule. Id.
at 203.
12 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). In MacPherson, the
court held that responsibility is owed to third parties who are injured by negligent activity, based
on the foreseeability of harm in the absence of due care. Id. at 1053.
13 See id.
14 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
2005]
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cerning negligently drafted wills and trusts arising when the person in privity
was no longer alive to sue for negligence.'
5
Although a few jurisdictions continue to strictly adhere to the privity re-
quirement in the context of attorney malpractice, 16 most have expanded the
scope of liability. 17 Just as courts have dismantled the privity requirement in
most areas of professional negligence, some courts have recognized the need to
extend attorneys' duties. 18 As the privity bar has declined, most courts have
adopted negligence as the appropriate doctrine to analyze cases dealing with
attorney liability to third parties. Generally, under most current case law, an
attorney may only be liable to a non-client for negligence if the client intended
the attorney's services to benefit the non-client or the attorney knew or should
have known that the non-client would rely on his or her actions. 20 Therefore,
third party beneficiaries have been the most successful in obtaining redress for
Is See, e.g., Garcia v. Borelli, 129 Cal. App. 3d 24, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Needham v. Ham-
ilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1063 (D.C. 1983); Arnold v. Carmichael, 524 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167, 1167-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Ogle v.
Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (I11. 1984); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987);
Hale v. Groce, 730 P.2d 576, 577 (Or. 1987); Guy v. Leiderbach, 459 A.2d 744, 751-53 (Pa.
1983); Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464, 470 (Wash. 1987).
16 See, e.g., Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (alleging negligence of attor-
ney toward someone other than client is not actionable under Pennsylvania law); Weigel v.
Hardesty, 549 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that an attorney was not liable to
third party for negligence); Bloomer Amusement Co. v. Eskanazi, 394 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (applying a strict privity rule, the court found that an attorney was not liable to a third party
for negligence); Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Mich. 1981) (holding that attorneys
are not liable to third parties for negligence); McDonald v. Steward, 182 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn.
1970) (declaring that attorneys are immune from third party suits in absence of fraud).
17 See, e.g., Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83-84 (Conn. 1981) (citing California authorities in
allowing third party to recover from attorney); McAbee, 340 So. 2d at 1170 (holding that privity
was not a bar to recovery when a plaintiff is the intended beneficiary); Woodfork v. Sanders, 248
So. 2d 419, 425 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (allowing recovery by an intended beneficiary against an
attorney despite lack ofprivity); Prescott v. Coppage, 296 A.2d 150, 156 (Md. 1972) (holding that
an attorney was liable to a primary creditor for allowing assets to be paid to lower priority credi-
tors); Steward v. Sbarro, 362 A.2d 581, 588-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding an at-
torney liable to an adverse party in a sale of property when he undertook a duty to complete trans-
actions for the adverse party).
18 Especially in suits by will beneficiaries against testators' attorneys. See, e.g., Heyer v.
Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 165 (Cal. 1969). See also Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
19 See Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (I11. 1982); Leak-Gilbert v. Fable, 55 P.3d
1054 (Okla. 2002); Guy, 459 A.2d at 748.
20 This principle is often seen in the area of will drafting. See, e.g., Elam v. Hyatt Legal
Servs., 541 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio 1989) (holding that beneficiaries whose interest in an estate had
vested were in privity with attorney who administered estate); Copenhaver v. Rogers, 384 S.E.2d
593 (Va. 1989) (declaring that it is possible for the beneficiary of a will to be an intended benefi-
ciary of the contract between the attorney and the client).
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- 21legal malpractice. In relaxing the privity requirement, courts have employed
two methods to analyze attorney malpractice cases, the balance of factors test
and the intended beneficiary theory, which are discussed below.
A. The Balance of Factors Test
The balance of factors test is one method used by courts to determine
whether an attorney can be liable for negligence to a third party. The Supreme
Court of California was the first court to abandon the strict privity requirement
for professional negligence in Biakanja v. Irving.22 This case involved a notary
public who negligently drafted a will. Under the strict privity requirement, the
intended beneficiaries were not entitled to recover. 24 The court concluded that
the determination of whether a defendant will be held liable to a third person not
in privity is a matter of public policy and involves the balancing of several fac-
tors. The factors to be balanced in each case include: (1) the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm,
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of prevent-
ing future harm.
26
This test has become key in analyzing attorney, liability cases. It was
first applied to attorney negligence in Lucas v. Hamm, which also involved a• • 28
negligently drafted will. As a result of the attorney's drafting error, the plain-
tiffs received a smaller share of the estate than the testator intended.29 After
balancing the factors set forth in Biakanja, the court concluded that the lack of
privity did not preclude the intended beneficiaries from recovering.
30
The balance of factors test has been used extensively in California cases
and has also been applied and discussed in many cases from other jurisdic-
21 See Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Cocoran, Mallin & Aresco, 605 A.2d 862 (Conn. 1992);
Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. 1996); Auric v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325
(Wis. 1983).
22 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
23 Id. at 17.
24 Id. at 19.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
28 Id. at 686.
29 Id. at 687.
30 Id. at 688.
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tions. 31 However, several courts have struggled with its application. 32  Al-
though the flexibility of the test satisfies the policy of recognizing an injured
party's right to redress, it is inadequate. Courts have criticized this test as being
vague and unworkable. 33 The uncertainty inherent in this approach "diminishes
the deterrent effect gained by extending liability to a broad class of third par-
ties.",34 Without clear boundaries of liability, an attorney may restrict his or her
services in risk-prone areas rather than exercising greater care in performing
those services. 35 Therefore, this test is not effective in analyzing attorney mal-
practice to third parties.
B. Intended Beneficiary Theory
The second theory utilized in evaluating malpractice cases involving at-
torney liability to third parties is the intended beneficiary theory. This analysis
requires that third parties suing for negligence establish that they are intended
beneficiaries of the attorney-client contract in order to extend the attorney's duty
to the third party. 36 These claims arise most often when an attorney's negligent
drafting injures a named beneficiary of a will. 37
31 See, e.g., Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976); Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733, 735-36 (Conn. 1988); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42,
49 (Kan. 1990); Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Minn. 1981); United Leasing Corp. v.
Miller, 263 S.E.2d 313, 317-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71, 76 (Wash.
1992) (en banc).
32 See, e.g., Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Inv., N.V., 512 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1987)
(rejecting the balance of factors test); Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d
624, 627-29 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (modifying the balance of factors test); Raritan River Steel Co.
v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting balance of factors test).
33 In Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983), the court stated that the balance of factors
test "has proved unworkable, and has led to ad hoc determinations and inconsistent results as the
California courts have attempted to refine the broad Lucas rule." Id. at 749. "The California
courts have not adopted a simple negligence standard, but ... have applied a six part balancing
test on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 749-50.
34 Scott Peterson, Expanding Legal Malpractice Liability to Nonclients - The Washington
Supreme Court Considers the Privity Requirement - Bowman v. John Doe Two, 104 Wn. 2d
181, 704 P.2d 140 (Wash. 1985), 61 WASH. L REv. 761, 777 (1986).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985); see also Pelham v. Gri-
esheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (I1. 1982) (intent to benefit the third party must be the primary or
direct purpose of the transaction or relationship). Under the third party beneficiary test, a third
party must show that he or she is the intended beneficiary of the contract between the attorney and
client. See Flaherty, 492 A.2d at 625.
37 See Estate of Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Simon v. Zipper-
stein, 512 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio 1987).
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The leading case applying this approach is Guy v. Leiderbach,3 8 which
involved an action brought by a will beneficiary against an attorney for improp-
erly directing the witnessing of a will.39 As a result of the attorney's negligence,
the beneficiary lost her bequest. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited the
class of persons who could bring an action in negligence to those who could
establish that they are intended beneficiaries of the attorney-client contract.
4t
Thus, under the third party beneficiary theory, the plaintiff was entitled to re-
covery from the negligent attorney.
42
Other jurisdictions have also adopted the intended beneficiary ap-
proach. 43 In these cases, the third party beneficiary theory bypasses the privity
requirement by establishing a relationship between the immediate client and the
third party on whose behalf the actions are taken. This approach restricts liabil-
ity for negligence to contract principles, thus failing to recognize a third party's
right to recovery.44 Additionally, it defines the scope of duty in legal malprac-
tice too narrowly by requiring a third party to show that he or she is an intended
beneficiary. 45 Furthermore, third parties are unable to recover unless the pri-
mary purpose of the contract is to benefit them.46 This requirement excludes a
large number of victims of attorney negligence. Therefore, by limiting the class
of injured third parties, this test fails to adequately deter attorney negligence.
Because only intended beneficiaries are entitled to relief, negligent conduct re-
sulting in injury to other third parties is not deterred. Accordingly, it is not the
most effective method for courts to use in evaluating attorney negligence.
II. COMMON TORT CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST AN ATTORNEY
A. Malicious Prosecution
Courts often cite malicious prosecution as the appropriate avenue for a
third party to take action against an attorney for wrongfully filing a lawsuit.47 In
most jurisdictions, the elements that are necessary to the maintain an action for
38 459 A.2d at 744.
39 Id. at 747.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 752-53.
42 Id.
43 See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983).
44 Peterson, supra note 34, at 775.
45 Id.
46 See Guy, 459 A.2d at 751-52.
47 See, e.g., Bird v. Rothman, 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
2005]
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* malicious prosecution are that the prosecution was malicious, that it was without
reasonable or probable cause, and that it was terminated favorably to the plain-
tiff.48 In order to make it more difficult for a plaintiff to succeed in a malicious
prosecution action, some jurisdictions have added an additional requirement of
proving special injury.49 These courts require a plaintiff to suffer a "special
injury" beyond those injuries that are normally incurred as a result of being
named in a lawsuit.50 The element of special injury is defined as "injury not
necessarily resulting in any and all suits prosecuted to recover for like causes of
action." 51 Damage to reputation, mental anguish, loss of time defending the
action, and increases in insurance premiums are all considered injuries common
to litigation; therefore these injuries do not constitute a "special injury." 52
The theory behind the requirement of favorable termination is that it in-
dicates the innocence of the accused. 53 In satisfying this requirement, courts
find that it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that a proceeding was merely
dismissed. 54 Therefore, if the dismissal is on technical grounds, for procedural
reasons, or any other reason inconsistent with guilt, it does not constitute a "fa-
vorable termination."5 5 Legal malice in a malicious prosecution action refers to
"any sinister or improper motive other than a desire to punish the party alleged
to have committed the offense."
56
Historically, the doctrine of malicious prosecution has not been favored
in the law. 57 Public policy requires that people be able to freely resort to courts
for redress of a wrong, and the law should protect them when they commence a
48 See, e.g., Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 378 (10th Cir. 1979); Morton v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 399 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1990).
49 See, e.g., Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Stopka v. Lesser, 402 N.E.2d
781, 782 (I11. App. Ct. 1980); Ackerman v. Lagano 412 A.2d 1054 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979).
50 See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Ammerman v.
Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 641 (D.C. 1978); Pantone v. Demos, 375 N.E.2d 480, 485 (Il1. App. Ct.
1978); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Ky. 1981); Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585,
599 (Mich. 1981); Ackerman v. Lagano, 412 A.2d 1054, 1057-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979); Dakters v. Shane, 412 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 569
P.2d 561, 563 (Or. 1977) (en banc); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567, 570-71 (Tex. App. 1978).
51 Stopka, 402 N.E.2d at 783 (quoting Schwartz v. Schwartz, 8 N.E.2d 668 (11. 1937)).
52 See id.
53 See Jaffe v. Stone, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (Cal. 1941).
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 McNair v. Erwin, 99 S.E. 454,454 (W. Va. 1919).
57 See, e.g., McCammon v. Oldaker, 516 S.E.2d 38, 45 (W. Va. 1999).
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civil suit or criminal action in good faith and on reasonable grounds. 58 Courts,
therefore, have taken the position that this policy necessitates a strict adherence
to the elements comprising an action for malicious prosecution. 59 A suit for
malicious prosecution cannot be prosecuted merely as retaliation for a bona fide
civil action. Because the malicious prosecution tort is intended to protect an
individual's interest in freedom from unjustifiable and unreasonable litigation, if
the court determines that the prior action was objectively reasonable, the plain-
tiff has failed to meet the threshold.
6t
However, when an attorney violates his or her professional duty to exe-
cute an action in good faith or on reasonable grounds, he or she should be liable
to a third party for negligence. Malicious prosecution is not the most effective
method of deterring attorney malpractice because a plaintiff is rarely successful
in the suit as a result of the court's strict adherence to the elements of the cause
of action.62 Most often, the plaintiffs cause of action fails because he or she is
unable to prove the elements of special injury and malice. 63
For example, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in bringing a malicious
prosecution action against the defendant attorney in Stopka v. Lesser. The
underlying case in Stopka involved a professional medical negligence action
filed by an attorney against a hospital and a treating emergency room physi-
cian.65 Approximately five months later, the attorney amended the complaint to
add an allegation of medical negligence against Dr. Stopka. 66 However, Dr.
Stopka was an inactive hospital staff member with no connection to the plain-
tiff's treatment. 67 Finally, seventeen months after he was named as a defendant
he was dismissed from the action.68 Subsequent to the dismissal, Dr. Stopka
58 See, e.g., Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978).
59 See, e.g., Pantone v. Demos, 375 N.E.2d 480 (I11. App. Ct. 1978); Wong v. Tabor, 422
N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Hill v. Willmott,
561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Ackerman v. Lagano, 412 A.2d 1054 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979).
60 McCammon, 516 S.E.2d at 38.
61 See Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 504 (Cal. 1989).
62 See Stopka v. Lesser, 402 N.E.2d 781 (111. Ct. App. 1980); Bortal v. Brower, 993 P.2d 629
(Kan. 1999); Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886 (S.C. 1994).
63 See Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 441 N.E.2d 1035 (Mass. 1982); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d
596 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
64 402 N.E.2d at 781.
65 Id. at 782.
6 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
2005]
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brought a malicious prosecution action against the attorney. 69 In support of his
claim, Dr. Stopka argued that the statute of limitations was not an issue in filing
the initial case, and that if the attorney reviewed the hospital records he would
know that Dr. Stopka was not involved in the plaintiff's treatment. Therefore,
as a result of the malicious prosecution, Dr. Stopka suffered a tarnished reputa-
tion, mental anguish, unnecessary time devoted to his defense, and as a result of
merely being named a defendant in the lawsuit, his medical malpractice insur-S71
ance premiums increased. Despite the egregious underlying facts, the court
found that Dr. Stopka's complaint failed to state a cause of action for malicious
prosecution because his injuries were only "ordinary damages" normally ex-
pected in litigation.
72
Malice is another element plaintiffs have difficulty proving. In Spencer
v. Burglass,73 the court found that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action
for malicious prosecution because "the allegation of 'frivolously filing suits'
cannot be construed as an allegation of malice."' 74 In that case, a physician filed
a malicious prosecution action against an attorney alleging that the attorney was
not justified in filing a lawsuit against her.75 The hospital records showed that
the four doctors who examined the patient found no damage to him and that
neither of the witnesses produced at trial were consulted prior to the trial. 76 The
physician alleged that her embarrassment, discomfort, and lost time were caused
by the attorney's failure to consult witnesses prior to trial and the failure to con-
sult with competent medical professionals regarding her patient's condition.
77
The court held that the attorney's actions did not constitute "malice" but merely
showed that the attorney did not know enough about his case, was negligent or
inept, and went to trial with a poor case. 78 "If that constitutes malice," the court
remarked, "the courtrooms are full of malicious attorneys."
79
These cases exemplify the need for courts to adopt negligence as a
cause of action against attorneys who file meritless suits against innocent third
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 783.
73 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
74 Id. at 599.
75 Id. at 598.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 599.
79 Id. at 600.
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parties. Justice is in no way furthered in either of these cases. The offending
attorney is neither punished nor deterred from bringing future frivolous actions
due to the court's strict adherence to the elements of malicious prosecution.
Typically, a plaintiff is only going to have suffered "ordinary damages," and it
is a rare occasion that an attorney acts with true malice when filing a lawsuit. In
many instances, a lawsuit is filed in the hopes that the defendant will settle
quickly rather than deal with the hassle and expense of litigating the claim.
Additionally, limiting recovery in these situations to a malicious prosecution
claim protects attorneys from suffering any consequences for their conduct and
does not discourage or limit the practice of filing baseless lawsuits, which harms
society in general. Therefore, malicious prosecution is an inadequate deterrent
to attorney negligence, and it essentially leaves innocent victims who have suf-
fered harm as a result of the attorney's negligence without any recourse.
B. Abuse of Process
Another method available to third parties seeking redress against an ad-
verse attorney for negligence is abuse of process. "The critical concern in abuse
of process cases is whether process was used to accomplish an end unintended
by law, and whether the suit was instituted to achieve a result not regularly...
obtainable." 80 The first prerequisite of an abuse of process claim is that the at-
torney had an ulterior purpose underlying the filing of the lawsuit or in the use
of the process employed. Second, it is necessary to have a willful act in the
use of process that is not proper in the course of the regular conduct of the pro-
ceeding. 82 An ulterior purpose includes any improper motive that underlies the
issuance of the legal process. 83 In Tappen v. Ager,84 evaluating an abuse of
process claim, the court stated that "[g]enerally, where a [plaintiff] considers a
malpractice action vexatious, harassing and brought merely as a nuisance suit to
coerce a settlement, he will be unable to recover for abuse of process."85 There-
fore, even though the attorney filed a baseless lawsuit, there was no cause of
action for abuse of process. Essentially, there is no liability when a defendant
has done nothing more than carry out the process to its conclusion even though
it is with bad intentions. Courts normally cite malicious prosecution as the ap-
80 Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980).
81 See, e.g., Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 379 (10th Cir. 1979).
82 See id. at 380.
83 See, e.g., Dutt v. Kremp, 894 P.2d 354, 360 (Nev. 1995), overruled in part by Lamantia v.
Redisi, 38 P.2d 877 (Nev. 2002).
84 599 F.2d at 376.
85 Id. at 380.
86 Id.
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propriate cause of action if an original action lacks merit and has been instituted
solely to coerce a settlement.8 7
In Morowitz v. Marvel, a group of physicians brought an action in
small claims court to collect money from a patient for delinquent medical
bills.8 9 The patient counterclaimed and alleged medical malpractice but eventu-
ally withdrew the claim. In turn, the physicians brought an action against the
patient and his attorney for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and profes-
sional negligence. 9 1 The court found no showing that the process was used to
accomplish an end "not regularly or legally obtainable." 92 Despite the fact that
the patient filed the counterclaim with the ulterior motive of coercing settlement,
there was no cause of action against his attorney.
93
In Dutt v. Kremp,94 the court held that an attorney did not harbor an ul-
terior motive in filing a lawsuit; therefore a cause of action for abuse of process
did not exist.95  In Dutt, the defendant attorney filed a "thoroughly inadequate
complaint against numerous doctors and a hospital two days before the effective
date of a statute that... required [him] to file a complaint with a medical-legal
screening panel" to determine the merit of the claim.96 All of the attorney's
research indicated that there was no negligence and that he should not file the
lawsuit, however, he filed it anyway in order to avoid the new statute. 97 The
court held this did not constitute abuse of process.
98
Both of these cases demonstrate that the tort of abuse of process is inef-
fective because it is too narrow in scope. As a result, it is insufficient to deter
baseless lawsuits. As the cases above demonstrate, a cause of action will rarely
exist for abuse of process. The possibility of an abuse of process action does not
deter attorneys from filing baseless lawsuits and provides no relief to those in-
87 See supra Part III.A.
88 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980).
89 Id. at 197.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 198-99.
93 id.
94 894 P.2d 354 (Nev. 1995), overruled in part by Lamantia v. Redisi, 38 P.3d 877 (Nev.
2002).
95 Id. at 360.
96 Id. at 361.
97 Id. at 357.
98 Id. at 360.
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jured as a result. Thus, an abuse of process cause of action is completely inade-
quate to solve the legal malpractice problem in the United States.
IV. NEGLIGENCE
A. Background
In order for a plaintiff to be successful in a negligence action, he or she
must show that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the de-
fendant breached the duty of care, (3) the defendant's conduct caused the plain-
tiff harm, and (4) damages occurred.99 Undoubtedly, when an attorney files a
frivolous lawsuit against an innocent person, the defendant suffers damages as a
result. Courts most often struggle with the element of duty when analyzing neg-
ligence claims filed by third party adversaries against attorneys. 100 Whether a
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff depends on several factors including: risk,
foreseeability, the likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the
actor's conduct, and the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury.10'
The applicable standard in attorney malpractice cases should be the same as in
all negligence actions. Hence, the duty an attorney owes to a third party adver-
sary is the duty to exercise the care that would be exercised by a reasonable pru-
dent attorney under the same or similar circumstances to avoid or minimize the
risk of harm to others.
Although a claim for negligence brought against an attorney by a third
party adversary has never been successful in the United States, courts are in-
creasingly addressing the issue. Most courts remain reluctant to recognize it as a
viable cause of action, but some opinions suggest a negligence cause of action
• • • 102
should exist against an attorney in some situations. For example, a Kentucky
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of attorney negligence in Hill v Will-
mott.103 Although the court ultimately refused to recognize negligence as the
appropriate cause of action in this case, it suggested that in some circumstances
liability may extend to an adversarial attorney.
104
In Hill, a physician brought an action against an attorney alleging he
was negligent in instituting a medical malpractice action against him. 105 He
99 Thomas v. Weddel, 605 S.E.2d 244,246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
100 See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Norton v. Hines, 123
Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
101 Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990).
102 See Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Schunk v. Zeff& Zeff, P.C., 311
N.W.2d 322 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
103 561 S.W.2d at 331.
104 Id. at 334.
105 ld. at 332.
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alleged that the attorney failed to exercise the degree of skill, care, and learning
ordinarily possessed by an average qualified attorney acting in the same or simi-
lar circumstances. 10 6 Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant at-
torney was negligent because prior to filing suit, he did not consult with the
plaintiff who was the treating physician, or any other physicians concerning the
skill, care, and technique normally used by a physician in this type of situa-
tion.10 7 Additionally, the attorney did not review any of the medical charts, did
not consult with the state or county health department in determining the accu-
racy of the physician's report, and was not even authorized to file a suit on the
patient's behalf.' 
08
The plaintiff in Hill urged the court to recognize a negligence cause of
action against the attorney for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation prior
to filing suit. 10 9 Essentially, the basis for his claim was that an attorney owes a
duty to an adversary to act in accordance with the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility that requires an attorney to act in a manner that "promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and [in] the legal pro-
fession."'' l  This duty was allegedly violated when the attorney filed an unau-
thorized suit against the physician that resulted in damages amounting to
$250,000.111 The court found that the Code of Professional Responsibility does
not establish a cause of action against an attorney for professional negligence.
112
Therefore, in this case there was no cause of action because the basis of the
complaint relied upon the Code of Professional Responsibility. 113 Although the
court refused to recognize negligence as a cause of action in this particular case,
it explained:
[t]his is not to say that a cause of action cannot be asserted for
negligence on the part of an attorney. All we are holding is that
the duty set forth in the Code and the Rules establishes the
minimum level of competency for the protection of the public
and a violation thereof does not necessarily give rise to a cause
of action. 
14
106 Id.
107 Id. at 332-33.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 333.
110 Id.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 333.
114 Id. at 334.
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Therefore, the court did suggest that a negligence cause of action brought by a
third party against an attorney may be acceptable under the right circumstances.
B. Policy Arguments Against Extending Negligence to Adversaries
Although third party victims of attorney negligence are increasingly
urging the court to adopt negligence as a cause of action, 115 there are several
reasons courts and commentators attribute to the refusal to relax the rule of priv-
ity and extend liability to adversaries. The main concern is "[e]xpanding the
scope of legal malpractice to include a growing number of non-client third par-
ties may result in a fundamental change in the traditional attorney-client rela-
tionship.",116 Rather than being the "zealous advocates" for their clients that the
Code of Professional Responsibility requires, it is argued attorneys will become
cautious of certain client requests or transactions that could potentially expose
them to malpractice liability. 117 It is also argued that once the privity rule is
relaxed, the number of persons a lawyer can be accountable to could be limit-
less. 118 Furthermore, it is believed that the threat of malpractice liability will
damage the confidentiality central to the attorney-client relationship because the
attorney will be concerned with his or her own liability rather than his or her
client's interests. 119
Most courts cite the most fundamental and key consideration of public
policy as a plaintiffs right to free access to the courts as a means of settling
claims and disputes. 12 Therefore, it can be argued that courts should be open to
11 See Weaver v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Morowitz. v.
Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 197 (D.C. 1980); Pantone v. Demos, 375 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978); Balthazar v. Dowling, 382 N.E.2d 1257, 1258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Stopka v. Lesser, 402
N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Iowa 1978); Gasis v.
Schwartz, 264 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 623 A.2d 272, 278
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Petrou v. Hale, 260 S.E.2d 130, 134 (N.C. 1979); Martin v.
Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
116 See Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Non-client Third Parties - At What
Cost?, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 15 (1989).
117 See id., Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 592-93 (Mich. 1981); Simon v. Zipperstein,
512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987); Bowman v. John Doe Two, 704 P.2d 140, 144 (Wash. 1985).
118 See Nat'i Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 202 (1879).
119 See, e.g., (cite to Cifu too-FN 114), Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 744 (Cal. 1976)
(extending liability beyond third parties to whom advice is foreseeably transmitted or relied upon
"would inject undesirable self-protective reservations into the attorney's counseling role"); Noble
v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1278 (Md. 1998) (requiring strict privity protects attorney-client confi-
dentiality); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 752 (Pa. 1983) (allowing such suits would perhaps
lower the quality of legal services rendered to clients); Chem-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover, 652
N.W.2d 756, 774 (S.D. 2002) ("Holding attorneys liable for aiding and abetting the breach of a
fiduciary duty in rendering professional services poses both a hazard and a quandary for the legal
profession.").
120 See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
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these litigants for the settlement of their rights without fear of prosecution for
calling upon the courts to determine such rights.121 Courts often conclude that
this public interest demands the rejection of any effort to extend tort liability for
the wrongful filing of a lawsuit beyond the realm of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process.' Additionally, it can be argued that even if a negligence
cause of action existed against attorneys, it is unlikely they will improve the
quality of their work. Rather, they will turn to malpractice insurers to cover the
increased risk of loss, which will lead to increasing insurance premiums likely
to be borne by clients in the form of higher fees.
C. Arguments For Expanding Liability: Schunk v. Zeff & Zeff, P.C.
In spite of these arguments, expanding liability for attorney malpractice
will generate attorneys who are more careful to avoid causing injury to non-
clients. Although the overwhelming weight of authority holds that an attorney
owes no legal duty to his or her client's adversary for negligence, a compelling
dissenting opinion in Schunk v. Zeff& Zeff, P.C. argued an attorney should be
liable under certain circumstances for negligence to his or her client's adver-
sary. 1 4 These circumstances include an attorney's "breach of his [or her] duty
to conduct a reasonable investigation before instituting suit where it is reasona-
bly foreseeable that a breach of such duty would injure the adversary."12 5
121 See id. The Hines court expelled the view that most courts have:
The attorney owes a duty to his client to present his case vigorously in a man-
ner as favorable to the client as the rules of law and professional ethics will
permit. He is an advocate and an officer of the court. He is cognizant of the
public policy that encourages his clients to solve their problems in a court of
law. In our opinion, when representing his client in the initiation of a lawsuit,
he should not be judged by a different standard... Against attorneys, however,
[the adverse litigant] proceeds on a cause of action for simple negligence which
requires a different and less demanding standard of proof. We believe the pub-
lic policy of favoring free access to our courts is still viable. However, if...
[his] cause of action against attorneys for negligence is permitted, this policy
will be subverted. The attorney must have the same freedom in initiating his
client's suit as the client. If he does not, lawsuits now justifiably commenced
will be refused by attorneys, and the client , in most cases, will be denied his
day in court.
Id.; see also Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 592-93 (Mich. 1981).
122 See generally, Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Bird v. Rothman,
627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (DC. 1980); Friedman
v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1981).
123 311 N.W.2d 322 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
124 Id. at 327 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
125 Id.
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Schunk involved a negligence action brought by a physician against an
attorney alleging that the attorney failed to investigate the merits of a medical
malpractice claim prior to commencing the action against the physician. 126 In a
dissenting opinion, it was suggested that the majority erred in finding that a neg-
ligence cause of action did not exist against the adverse attorney. The dis-
senting opinion concluded that attorneys should be liable for negligence to their
clients' adversaries for breach of their duty to conduct a reasonable investigation
before filing suit where it is reasonably foreseeable that a breach of such a duty
would injure the adversary. 128
1. An Attorney Has a Duty to Investigate
"[W]hile the adversary system requires that an attorney be devoted to
the cause of his client, justice requires that one who has suffered a wrong have
access to the courts to seek his remedy."' 129 According to the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, an attorney shall not file a suit, assert a position, or
take any other action on behalf of his client unless there is a basis in both law
and fact. 130 Additionally, an attorney shall not knowingly proceed with a claim
or defense unless it can be supported by a good faith argument for "an exten-
sion, modification or reversal of existing law."' 3 1 According to the Schunk dis-
sent,
[t]he meritoriousness of the action is a matter that must always
be carefully considered by the attorney. It is his duty to advise
a client fully and completely on the merits of his case [and] [i]f
he finds that there is not merit in the contemplated action, it is
his duty to advise his client to that effect and not to represent
him in court if the client refuses... such advice.
1 32
Furthermore, when an attorney appears in court, he or she is represent-
ing to the court that he or she examined their client's claim, that there is merit in
it, and that the claim is not being asserted for the purpose of delay or harass-
126 Id. at 323.
127 Id. at 327-33 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 332. The majority opinion concluded that there was no cause of action against an
attorney by a third party for negligence. Id. at 327.
129 Id.
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004).
131 Id.
132 Schunk, 311 N.W.2d at 327 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting) (quoting GILMORE, 1 MICHIGAN
CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.3(D) (2d. ed. 1975)).
2005]
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss2/9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ment. 133 Lawyers are required by the Code of Professional Responsibility to
moderate their zeal in fulfilling their obligations as officers of the court.
1 3 4
However, an attorney's duty to represent his client with zeal does not reduce the
attorney's obligation to treat all persons involved in the legal process "with con-
sideration ... and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." 135 Therefore, re-
quiring a duty of reasonable investigation prior to initiating a lawsuit would
neither conflict with nor restrict an attorney's duty and obligations to his client,
but would complement it.
136
Additionally, the Schunk dissent emphasized that cases that have inter-
preted Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unanimously hold that
the rule places "an affirmative obligation on the attorney who signs a pleading
to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to . . . filing ... [the] pleading."'
The purpose of the signature rule is to impose a duty on attorneys to preclude
the filing of frivolous and baseless claims by requiring that attorneys conduct a
reasonable investigation enabling them to represent in good faith that it is his or
her honest belief that there are both facts and law supporting the claim. 138 Thus,
the attorney-client relationship imposes an affirmative obligation by an attorney
to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to filing a suit to determine whether a
viable claim exists. 139
2. Liability Should be Based on Foreseeability
An attorney's liability should not end with being accountable to his or
her client. Attorneys should also answer to third parties who have suffered an
injury or loss as a result of negligent conduct on the attorneys' part. As dis-
cussed in Section II, the privity doctrine has been abandoned in the areas of
general negligence, products liability, and in most areas of professional liability
in order to avoid harsh results. 14 Absent privity through a contractual relation-
ship, liability for negligent legal advice or actions is only created where: "(1) the
law imposes a duty of care on the attorney with respect to the plaintiff, (2) it is
foreseeable that [the] plaintiff will be harmed by the attorney's negligence, and
(3) the plaintiff actually suffers harm as a result of the attorney's negligence."
14 1
133 Id. at 327.
134 Id. at 328.
135 Id. (quoting WISE, LEGAL ETHics 327 (1979 Supp.)).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See supra Part II.
141 Schunk, 311 N.W.2d at 330 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
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The law imposes an affirmative duty on attorneys to investigate a claim by mak-
ing reasonable inquiries and examining all the evidence that is accessible and
reasonably available to make a good faith determination that a factual and legal
basis for their claim exists, and withdrawing from the litigation as soon as it
becomes clear that there is no basis for liability. 142 Undoubtedly, this duty ex-
tends to persons who become defendants to groundless lawsuits. 143 Certainly, it
is foreseeable to an attorney that a person who is subjected to a groundless law-
suit will suffer damages.'"
Where an attorney files a lawsuit without undertaking an adequate in-
vestigation in order to form a good faith belief a valid claim is involved, it is
unreasonable to conclude that harm to a client's potential adversary is not fore-
seeable.145 The potential harm to the adversary is significant. It includes eco-
nomic harm in the form of legal fees, lost time spent defending the claim, and a
potential increase in the cost of malpractice insurance or even the cancellation of
malpractice insurance. 146 Additionally, the third party adversary will likely
suffer emotional distress and a tarnished reputation that can potentially lead to
further financial loss. 14 7 This potential harm to a third party adversary is fore-
seeable to a reasonable attorney when he or she engages in a substandard inves-
tigation. 148 This risk coupled with the social policies discussed herein favor that
courts enforce an affirmative duty on attorneys to conduct an adequate investi-
gation prior to filing claims on behalf of their clients. 149 The potential for harm
"outweighs the competing considerations favoring an unrestrained legal profes-
sion." 15 Thus, an attorney's conduct is not entitled to absolute protection under
the law. 151
3. Policy Concerns Revisited
Attorneys should not be deterred from zealously representing the claims
of their clients. No inconsistency exists between an attorney's affirmative duty
to zealously advocate his or her client's interests and the recognition of a duty to
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 331.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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their client's adversary to investigate a claim prior to filing suit. 152 Attorneys
already bear the duty of representing their clients "within the bounds of the
law." 153 According to the dissent in Schunk,
[t]he bounds of the law can and should require counsel to fulfill
his [or her] professional trust and responsibility to the court, the
public, and potential adversary parties by conducting.., a rea-
sonable investigation under the circumstances... [that] is nec-
essary and appropriate to form a good faith belief that his [or
her] client has a tenable claim. 1
54
The recognition and enforcement of a duty to third party adversaries does not
diminish the principle of zealous representation.155 In fact, a duty to an adver-
sary is consistent with the duties that already exist under the rules of profes-•, . 156
sional responsibility. An attorney has an obligation to his or her client and to
all others involved in the legal process.1 7 Accordingly, requiring a duty of rea-
sonable investigation to a client's adversary is coextensive with an attorney's
existing ethical duties.1
5 8
Another argument offered to preclude negligence actions brought by
third parties against attorneys is that it would undermine the public policy of
favoring free access to the courts.15 9 Although courts most often cite this argu-
ment, it is not compelling because under the Canons of Professional Responsi-
bility, an attorney has a duty to exercise professional judgment in analyzing the
facts and applicable law to determine whether their client has a tenable claim or
a groundless one. 16  Therefore, an attorney is already required to assess the
merits of the claim in relation to available facts even if the client is intent on
filing suit.1 61 Presumably, an attorney licensed to practice law is capable of
determining what facts are fundamentally relevant to determine if a bona fide
claim exists. Although minds may differ regarding the likelihood of success
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 ld.
155 Id.
156 See id.
M5 Id.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 332.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 Id.
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of a case, minds should not differ in evaluating whether an attorney satisfied the
minimal requirement of advancing only plausible claims and in determining
whether the preliminary investigation into the facts was sufficient. 163 Because
the legal duty called for does not extend beyond the attorney's existing obliga-
tions, free access would not be restricted. 1
64
The duty of an attorney to conduct a reasonable preliminary investiga-
tion into relevant facts creates no additional burdens on the attorney that he or
she will not have to bear eventually in the course of the litigation if he or she
genuinely intends to present a convincing case to the court and the jury. 165
Unless an attorney is under the pressure of the statute of limitations, he or she
has no excuse for failing to review readily available material before filing suit
against a possibly innocent or even an uninvolved party.166
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Fairness and integrity are the core of the American judicial system. At-
torneys and judges pride themselves on being honorable advocates of justice.
However, the profession has been plagued by a growth in the number of frivo-
lous lawsuits. As discussed in Section III, malicious prosecution and abuse of• . 167
process are rarely successful, even under egregious circumstances. Thus,
neither provides adequate redress for an injured third party, nor serves as an
effective deterrent against unfounded lawsuits. Why should attorneys who are
negligent be insulated from their own carelessness or incompetence?
Negligence is the only appropriate cause of action that will deter attor-
neys from filing baseless lawsuits and punish them for their incompetence. The
purposes underlying negligence law are to redress wrongs by shifting the losses
caused by negligent conduct to the culpable party and to deter culpable behav-
ior. Therefore, future public harm will be prevented, and the quality of legal
services will be enhanced if liability for legal malpractice is expanded.
It is true an attorney's primary purpose is to zealously serve his or her
client's interests. However, this general rule does not mean an attorney may act
fraudulently or deceitfully in dealing with third party adversaries. The relaxation
of the privity requirement needs to also extend to the adversary relationship. An
attorney owes a duty to the client's adversary to conduct a reasonable investiga-
tion, and the applicable standard should be that an attorney is answerable in neg-
ligence to his or her client's adversary for the failure to conduct a reasonable
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 Id.
167 See supra Part III.
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investigation that allows the attorney to make a good-faith determination that
there are legal and factual grounds to support the allegations contained in the
complaint. An attorney has grounds to represent a client in litigation when, after
a reasonable investigation and search of legal authority, he or she has an honest
belief the client's claim is tenable. The attorney must not only have a subjective
belief that the claim merits litigation, but that belief must also satisfy an objec-
tive standard. As long as the attorney does not abuse the duty of zealous repre-
sentation by prosecuting a claim a reasonable lawyer would not regard as ten-
able or by unreasonably neglecting to investigate the facts and law in making his
or her determination to proceed, his or her client's adversary has no right to as-
sert a negligence cause of action.
Courts that have refrained from adopting a duty to a non-client are being
overprotective of the legal profession. Courts are willing to hold other profes-
sionals liable to non-clients, but consistently refuse to extend this liability to
attorneys. However, attorneys should not enjoy special protection from third
party liability. It is time to apply the law equally to attorneys and recognize they
also owe a duty to non-clients.
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